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ABSTRACT
This contribution explores John Calvin’s position on natural theology. The point of 
departure is not so much the much discussed notions of a sensus divinitatis or of the 
semen religionis, but the role played by the human senses in coming to knowledge 
of God in the first place. How can God’s presence be recognised? How can human 
language (that which is natural), from below, express the inexpressible? How is 
it possible to speak of God in the first place? This article suggests that Calvin’s 
remarkably sophisticated understanding of signification is the clue to respond to 
these questions. His position is discussed on the basis of the reading strategy of 
catena and commentary. The author finally offers some concluding observations on 
the relationship between signifier, signified and referent in human language about 
God.
CALVIN AND “NATURAL” THEOLOGY?
I do not wish to claim Calvin’s support for the position on natural theology constructed in the 
previous essay. Nevertheless, Calvin was evidently not oblivious to the hermeneutical problem 
of coming to knowledge of God. He was also aware how intertwined the Christian faith is 
with other forms of knowing. Instead, I will structure this contribution as a conversation with 
Calvin, realising that others may be overhearing the conversation. The aim of this contribution 
is not so much to engage in reconstructive work on Calvin’s position, but to test this thesis in 
conversation with Calvin’s views on the role played by the human senses. My intention is to 
make a contribution to reformed discourse on natural theology, but also to bring insights from 
Calvin’s Institutes into play in the context of contemporary discourse on natural theology.
To explore Calvin’s position on “natural theology” is to open a proverbial can of worms. Both 
Brunner (2002:35-50) and Barth (2002:94-109) appealed to Calvin to support their respective 
positions and criticised each other’s reading of Calvin. I cannot hope to review or contribute to 
the voluminous Calvin scholarship with regard to his position on natural theology, or his notions 
of “accommodation” and of the semen religionis. Suffice it to say that his position is difficult 
to interpret since it is embedded in deeply intertwined theological contrasts between what is 
called “general and “special” revelation, between the knowledge of God and of ourselves and in 
the metaphor that Scripture provides us with the necessary spectacles to see God in the world 
of nature. Furthermore, all of these terms are influenced by theological positions on the relation 
between nature and grace.
Here I will not explore such a notion of “natural theology”, that is, of knowledge of the triune 
God that may be derived from a contemplation of “nature” excluding God’s revelation in Jesus 
Christ. Instead, my focus will be on the question whether Calvin’s position on knowledge of 
God as Mediator (in Jesus Christ) can be affirmed if one maintains that all theology may be 
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regarded as natural theology (as proposed above). More specifically, how can one hear with 
human ears God’s word of forgiveness as indeed God’s word? My focus will therefore be on 
Calvin’s understanding of the role of the human senses, especially seeing and hearing, and the 
visual imagery that he employs.
For the sake of simplicity I will adopt here the style of catena and commentary and supplement 
that with some concluding observations.
CALVIN ON THE POSSIBILITY OF LANGUAGE ABOUT GOD?
a) “Without knowledge of self there is no knowledge of God: Nearly all the wisdom we possess, 
that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of 
ourselves. But, while joined by many bonds, which one precedes and brings forth the other is 
not easy to discern.” (I.1.1).
The famous opening sentence of Calvin’s Institutes has elicited much discussion. I remember 
one night in my student years when I set out to read the Institutes and could not get beyond 
the first sentence. The creative tensions and antithetical structures that are so typical of Calvin’s 
theology and rhetoric are nowhere more evident than here. I do not wish to comment on his 
understanding of the knowledge of God as piety (reverence) or on his own emphasis that “without 
knowledge of God there is no know ledge of self” (the title of I.1.2). Instead, his awareness of the 
hermeneutical tension is important for my purposes here. The argument of the very first section 
is that the knowledge of our selves, “the feeling of our own ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity, 
and – what is more – depravity and corruption” leads us to seek God.  But how is such knowledge 
of our misery possible? Calvin insists “man is never sufficiently touched and affected by the 
awareness of his lowly state until he has compared himself with God’s majesty” (I.1.3). Given 
the human inclination towards self-delusion, self-admiration and flattery (II.1.2) such knowledge 
of human misery cannot be gained merely through introspection. Here too the knowledge of 
God seems to be the key to the knowledge of the self. Nevertheless, he does not resolve the 
tension all that easily; it remains “strangely ambiguous”, resisting textual closure (Jones 1995:87, 
94). This is indicated by the closing sentence of I.1.3: “Yet, however the knowledge of God and 
of ourselves may be mutually connected, the order of right teaching requires that we discuss 
the former first, then proceed afterward to treat the latter.” What this “order of right teaching” 
amounts to can only be discerned from the structure of the entire Institutes. In I.15.1 he does 
return to this topic. Observing that “This knowledge of ourselves is twofold: namely, to know 
what we were like when we were first created and what our condition became after the fall of 
Adam.” The knowledge of ourselves is there fore not based on introspection or on social analysis 
but on witness of Scripture. For the moment it may suffice to observe that Calvin is not unaware 
of the hermeneutical tension at play here. Indeed, knowledge of God is connected to knowledge 
of ourselves and, one may add, of our world.
b) “There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. 
This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretence of 
ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty” 
(I.3.1).
This is Calvin’s equally famous and much debated notion of semen religionis. Calvin insists 
that “from the beginning of the world there has been no region, no city, in short, no household, 
that could do without religion, there lies in this a tacit confession of a sense of deity inscribed in 
the hearts of all” (I.3.1). Even idolatry provides ample proof of this sense of the divine. In words 
that pre-empt the critique of religion of Marx and Lenin by several centuries he adds that “it is 
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utterly vain for some men to say that religion was invented by the subtlety and craft of a few 
to hold the simple folk in thrall by this device and that those very persons who originated the 
worship of God for others did not in the least believe that any God existed” (I.3.2). Calvin eagerly 
concedes that forms of religion can be employed to strike common folk with terror, but insists 
that this would not be possible if our minds “had not already been imbued with a firm conviction 
about God, from which the inclination toward religion springs as from a seed” (I.3.2).
The question is what role this sense of the divine plays in obtaining knowledge of the triune 
God. The point of Calvin’s argument is, of course, that any such knowledge is corrupted through 
ignorance and malice, that this cannot lead to true knowledge of God (since zeal for religion 
is not sufficient on its own – I.4.3) and that such “seed of religion” only serves to render us 
without the excuse of ignorance. Yes, the seed remains (there is some sense of divinity) and 
cannot be uprooted, but by itself produces only the worst fruits (I.4.4). It enables people to find 
sprinklings, droplets of truth. Whatever truth is seen in this way cannot and does not direct one 
to the truth (of God’s favour) and does not enable one to attain it (II.2.18). In Book III Calvin 
also insists that there is no “seed of election” (a religious gene?), as if some are more inclined 
than others to piety and the fear of God (III.24.10). God’s election is appropriated through God’s 
call and this comes to human beings from outside themselves. However, the question remains 
whether this seed of religion plays any herme neutical role in obtaining knowledge of the triune 
God? This question is less easy to answer since Calvin “does not investigate psychologically or 
metaphysically the nature of the act of cognition” (Parker 1995:14)!
c) “… wherever you cast your eyes, there is no spot in the universe wherein you cannot discern at 
least some sparks of his glory. You cannot in one glance survey this most vast and beautiful system 
of the universe, in its wide expanse, without being completely overwhelmed by the boundless 
force of its brightness. The reason why the author of The Letter to the Hebrews elegantly calls 
the universe the appearance of things invisible [Heb. 11:3] is that this skilful ordering of the 
universe is for us a sort of mirror in which we can contemplate God, who is otherwise invisible” 
(I.5.1).
The seed of religion is not only sown in the human mind; God is revealed in the glory of 
creation so much so that no one can open his or her eyes without being compelled to see God 
(I.5.1). The divine wisdom is displayed for all to see (I.5.2) – in the fields of astronomy, medicine, 
the natural sciences and structure of the human body (humanity as a microcosm) and of course 
also in history and in signs of God’s providence. That this is evidently not seen or misunderstood 
has to do with humans being blindfolded, not with being blind.2 This has led us to confuse 
creatures with the Creator. Calvin employs his considerable rhetorical skills to heap up adjectives 
to describe such ungratefulness, stupidity, malice, wickedness, corruption, vanity, superstition, 
idolatry and hypocrisy. Thus the abundant evidence of God in the created order is to no avail 
(I.5.11). The manifestation of God in nature speaks to us in vain (I.5.14). Although they bathe 
us wholly in their radiance, they cannot lead us towards the right path to find the knowledge of 
God.
d) “Just as old or bleary-eyed men and those with weak vision, if you thrust before them a most 
beautiful volume, even if they recognize it to be some sort of writing, yet can scarcely construe 
two words, but with the aid of spectacles will begin to read distinctly; so Scripture, gathering up 
the otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds, having dispersed our dullness, clearly 
2  See also Calvin’s comment: “But although the Lord represents both himself and his everlasting Kingdom 
in the mirror of his works with very great clarity, such is our stupidity that we grow increasingly dull 
toward so manifest testimonies, and they flow away without profiting us.” (I.5.11).
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shows us the true God” (I.6.1).
Calvin uses the often-discussed image of “spectacles” to argue that Scripture is needed as 
guide and teacher in order to come to knowledge of God as Creator. Note that the image is 
reversed here: we do not need spectacles to read Scripture; we need the spectacles of Scripture 
to detect God’s presence in nature (see Parker 1952:25f). This is, for example, reiterated in the 
work of Herman Bavinck (see 2003:340f) who followed Calvin closely in this line of argumentation. 
It should also be noted that Calvin insists that Scripture is required both for knowledge of God 
as Saviour and of God as Creator. The way in which Calvin distinguishes between the themes of 
creation and redemption is controversial (to say the least) as this also guides the structure of 
the entire institutes. For the moment it would suffice to note that the spectacles of Scripture 
are required in order to gain knowledge of God as Creator and to prevent us from seeking the 
creator in other deities through devious paths. The problem is not that we cannot see (that we 
are totally blind), but that we are short-sighted – that we cannot see clearly without the reading 
aid of Scripture (a point disputed by Parker 1952:39). We need not only eyes to contemplate 
God’s works but also ears to hear God’s Word (I.6.2). Without Scripture we fall into error (I.6.3). 
It should be noted that the contem pla tion of God’s works therefore does not necessarily 
direct us away from God’s revelation in Jesus Christ; to know God in Jesus Christ redirects our 
attention towards the works of God – which supports and confirms the knowledge of God in 
Christ. God’s Word provides us with the “spectacles” to heal our sight in order to see God’s 
glory. As Schreiner (1991:107) puts it: “The noetic effect of sin is gradually corrected when the 
soul is reordered so that once again the cosmos can serve as a ‘stage’, ‘theatre’, or ‘book’ from 
which believers are encouraged to learn about their Creator.” Reading the scripture does not 
replace or guide us away from contemplation of nature, but provides us with the spectacles 
precisely in order to engage in such contemplation (Zachman 2006:196). From the Bible we 
find the clues to identify God’s presence in our own experience, in history, in creation and also 
amongst other faith traditions. As Postema (1992:429) suggests: “Obviously, the Bible does add 
to our knowledge of God … but it does so only to clarify and untangle the cloudy and confused 
knowledge of God that we get from extra-biblical sources, to restore it to its original function.”
On this basis it is also important to note that, for Calvin, this knowledge of God as Creator 
logically comes first. Unlike for Von Rad and others, knowledge of God as Creator is no mere 
extrapolation of faith in God as Saviour. Calvin says: “First in order came that kind of knowledge 
by which one is permitted to grasp who that God is who founded and governs the universe. Then 
that other inner knowledge was added, which alone quickens dead souls, whereby God is known 
not only as the Founder of the universe and the sole Author and Ruler of all that is made, but 
also in the person of the Mediator as the Redeemer” (I.6.1). He concludes “knowledge of God, 
otherwise quite clearly set forth in the system of the universe and in all creatures, is nonetheless 
more intimately and also more vividly revealed in his Word” (I.10.1). Here he comes close to 
but does not actually grant that such knowledge of God derived from the contemplation of 
nature also provides as with some preunderstanding that influences our reading of Scripture – 
for better or for worse.
e) “Certainly I do not deny that one can read competent and apt statements about God here 
and there in the philosophers, but these always show a certain giddy imagination. As was 
stated above, the Lord indeed gave them a slight taste of his divinity that they might not hide 
their impiety under a cloak of ignorance. And sometimes he impelled them to make certain 
utterances by the confession of which they would themselves be corrected. But they saw things 
in such a way that their seeing did not direct them to the truth; much less enable them to attain 
it! They are like a traveller passing through a field at night who in a momentary lightning flash 
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sees far and wide, but the sight vanishes so swiftly that he is plunged again into the darkness 
of the night before he can take even a steplet alone be directed on his way by its help. Besides, 
although they may chance to sprinkle their books with droplets of truth, how many monstrous 
lies defile them!” (II.2.18).
A number of aspects in this remarkable passage may be noted. Of course, Calvin’s primary 
intention here is to emphasise that the knowledge of God that may be derived from the (philo-
sophical) contemplation of nature is severely limited. It cannot even begin to imagine God’s 
mercy and benevolence towards us. It provides no right knowledge of God but renders humans 
without any excuse for not obtaining such knowledge by claiming ignorance (II.2.22). Yet, 
Calvin’s favoured visual imagery is striking. Human beings are blindfolded by sin but we are not 
blind. We cannot see because of the darkness of the night, but are indeed able to see flashes of 
light – but this is not sufficient to guide us on our way. Without the illumination of the Spirit we 
remain in darkness. As Calvin eloquently adds, “the sun rises upon the earth when God’s Word 
shines upon men; but they do not have its benefit until he who is called the “Father of lights” 
[James 1:17] either gives eyes or opens them. For wherever the Spirit does not cast his light, all 
is darkness” (II.2.21). 
Again, nature provides us with the eyes to see; that we in fact do not see is the result of being 
blindfolded. Here too Calvin stops short of exploring the hermeneutical significance of such an 
ability to see when seeing the light (when reading Scripture). His emphasis is clearly on the gift 
of God’s revelation and illumination and not on the human ability to understand.  Without the 
Light of the world shining upon us, we would not see, even if we were able to see. To focus on 
our seeing (which Calvin seems to take for granted) would misdirect the attention away from the 
guidance that we require when hopelessly lost in the dark of a cloudy night.
f) “Indeed, if we chose to explain in a fitting manner how God’s inestimable wisdom, power, 
justice, and goodness shine forth in the fashioning of the universe, no splendour, no ornament 
of speech, would be equal to an act of such great magnitude. There is no doubt that the Lord 
would have us uninterruptedly occupied in this holy meditation; that, while we contemplate in 
all creatures, as in mirrors, those immense riches of his wisdom, justice, goodness, and power, 
we should not merely run over them cursorily, and, so to speak, with a fleeting glance; but we 
should ponder them at length, turn them over in our minds seriously and faithfully, and recol-
lect them repeatedly. But because our purpose here is to teach, it is proper for us to omit those 
matters, which require long harangue. Therefore, to be brief, let all readers know that they have 
with true faith apprehended what it is for God to be Creator of heaven and earth, if they first of 
all follow the universal rule, not to pass over in ungrateful thoughtlessness or forgetf ulness those 
conspicuous [sic] powers which God shows forth in his creatures, and then learn so to apply it 
to themselves that their very hearts are touched. The first part of the rule is exemplified when 
we reflect upon the greatness of the Artificer who stationed, arranged, and fitted together the 
starry host of heaven in such wonderful order that nothing more beautiful in appearance can be 
imagined; who so set and fixed some in their stations that they cannot move; who granted to 
others a freer course, but so as not to wander outside their appointed course; who so adjusted 
the motion of all that days and nights, months, years, and seasons of the year are measured off; 
who so proportioned the inequality of days, which we daily observe, that no confusion occurs. 
It is so too when we observe his power in sustaining so great a mass, in governing the swiftly 
revolving heavenly system, and the like. For these few examples make sufficiently clear what it is 
to recognize God’s powers in the creation of the universe. Otherwise, as I have said, if I decide to 
set forth the whole matter in my discourse, there will be no end” (I.14.21).
One may regard this passage as one of the clearest examples in Calvin’s Institutes of what 
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would elsewhere be deemed a form of natural theology. However, it should be noted that Calvin 
here focuses on knowledge of God as Creator, that his account is deliberately brief in order to 
avoid speculation, that he insists that Scripture is necessary to understand such knowledge of 
God as Creator clearly (as discussed above) and that the brevity of his account here should be 
compared with his elaborate discussion of knowledge of God as Redeemer. 
In my view the true significance of this passage can only be grasped within the context of 
his theology as a whole – in the interplay between the themes of creation, sin, providence, 
redemption and the eschatological restoration of all things. Susan Schreiner (1991:121) is on 
the right track here: “As the perceptual breakdown caused by sin is healed through the Spirit 
and Scriptures, nature regains its revelatory function as a mirror, a painting, and a theatre of 
the divine glory.” In terms of the metaphor of being blindfolded that Calvin is so fond of, the 
natural ability to see is restored through redemption. It is not that we are given completely 
new eyes by listening to the Word of God. The Word helps us to see once again that which was 
before our eyes all the time. It removes the blindfold imposed by sin so that we can indeed see. 
As John McNeill (1960:liii) comments in his introduction to the Institutes, “Yet men [sic] are so 
damaged by the heritage of sin entailed by Adam’s fall that they miss this testimony of creation 
to the Creator, and grope blindfold in this bright theatre of the universe with only erroneous and 
unworthy notions of the God who made it.”
Another metaphor that Calvin is fond of is that of the mirror. In the passage quoted above 
creatures are portrayed as mirrors of the immense riches of God’s wisdom. The universe is the 
mirror in which we can contemplate the invisible God (I.5.1). This is portrayed with “very great 
clarity” (I.5.11). Humankind is also a clear mirror of God’s works (I.5.3). This also applies to 
the ministry of angels (I.14.5). Elsewhere Calvin uses the image with reference to God’s law 
as a mirror for the knowledge of sin (II.7.6, 7), with reference to Scripture as a source of the 
knowledge of our human arrogance (II.2.11, II.3.2), but also of the knowledge of God (III.2.6), and 
especially with reference to the incarnation of Jesus Christ as a bright mirror of God’s boundless 
love (II.12.4, II.14.7) and his resurrection as a mirror of Christ’s divinity (II.16.13). Elsewhere he 
speaks of faith as an act of seeing our future inheritance as if in a mirror (II.11.1), even though 
we see that now only dimly (1 Cor 13:12). 
Here too Calvin consistently maintains visual imagery. The problem is not that we are blind 
but that we cannot see the image that we are looking at clearly. The problem is not that the 
image is too dim but that it is too bright – we therefore require a dimmed, reflected image of 
God, accommodated to our human sensibilities (Battles 1998:36). The clarity and focus of the 
image is only found on the basis of Jesus Christ, Scripture and the illumination of the Holy Spirit 
through Christian proclama tion. The Spirit corrects the noetic effect of sin and enables the pious 
contemplation of nature as the mirror, the theatre of God’s glory (Schreiner 1991:122). This is 
consistent with Calvin’s insistence through out the Institutes that nothing falls outside the sphere 
of God’s sovereignty. Our ability to see and to understand is not ignored or even downplayed; it 
is acknowledged and restored but only through God’s grace. If Calvin did not acknowledge the 
hermeneutical role of such natural knowledge in reading Scripture and hearing God’s Word, he 
might have taken that simply for granted.
In his work “As in a mirror” (Als in een Spiegel) Cornelis van der Kooi (2002:58-64) explores the 
metaphor of seeing an image in a mirror as the clue to Calvin’s understanding of knowledge of 
God (better: of knowing God). The point of the image is of course that we can know God only in 
a mediated way (by way of imitation), namely through God’s reflection in God’s works (including 
the heavens above, but also humanity, the incarnation and the full range of other traces of 
God’s presence). The possibility of seeing a reflection in the mirror is not so much a function of 
human capabilities but of that, which is, reflected in the mirror, namely God self. This possibility, 
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one may surmise, is a function of God’s accommodatio. For Calvin the metaphor suggests that 
knowledge of God is not a matter of abstraction or demonstration but of immediate and intuitive 
knowledge (cognitio intuitiva). It is a direct form of knowledge based on the recognition of God’s 
immediate presence, albeit the presence of a mirror image of lesser quality and not a direct visio 
Dei. Van der Kooi notes that mirrors in Calvin’s day were made of plated metal allowing for a 
reliable but somewhat dimmer reflection than what is possible though glass mirrors nowadays. 
The reliability of the image is for Calvin crucial because it dovetails with his affirmation of the 
clarity of Scripture and of assurance of salvation. It is thus important to emphasise that knowing 
God requires from us to look at those mirrors in which God’s is most clearly reflected. The image 
of God in the pond (God’s non-human creation) is muddied by human sin, whereas the clearest 
image may be found in Jesus Christ and in the contemporary context through the sacraments 
(see below). At the same time it metaphor of a mirror image suggests that one should not focus 
on the possibilities of the mirror itself (although the mirror is indeed necessary), or on the image 
in the mirror but on the Person whose image is reflected. That can only be understood by way of 
following the direction towards which a sign points. This is only possible through the guidance of 
the Holy Spirit who uses the mirror images to establish communion between God and humans 
on this basis (Van der Kooi 2002:63).
g) “To sum up: When first even the least drop of faith is instilled in our minds, we begin to contem-
plate God’s face, peaceful and calm and gracious toward us. We see him afar off, but so clearly 
as to know we are not at all deceived. Then, the more we advance as we ought continually to 
advance, with steady progress, as it were, the nearer and thus surer sight of him we obtain; and 
by the very continuance he is made even more familiar to us. So we see that the mind, illumined 
by the knowledge of God, is at first wrapped up in much ignorance, which is gradually dispelled. 
… Thus, bound with the fetters of an earthly body, however much we are shadowed on every 
side with great darkness, we are nevertheless illumined as much as need be for firm assurance 
when, to show forth his mercy, the light of God sheds even a little of its radiance” (III.2.19).
In his discussion of the nature of faith Calvin emphasises that faith is based on knowledge, not 
ignorance, superstition or gullibility (III.2.2-3). Yet, faith as knowledge far exceeds human sense 
perception. It is not merely derived from a human capacity to understand. The knowledge of 
faith, Calvin insists, “consists in assurance rather than in comprehension” (III.2.14). Its certainty 
is based on the Word of God and more specifically on the sealed promises of God.
At the same time, faith is not independent of human sense perception but works through 
it. The Spirit works through the letter not alongside that. In the passage quoted above it is 
remarkable to observe the use of visual imagery. Faith is a matter of light and of sight, albeit 
that the emphasis in not on the human ability to see, but on the object that is seen and on the 
light that is cast to make such seeing possible. The problem, one may add, is not so much a lack 
of light but that the light is so overwhelming that we are blinded by it (see Hesselink 1997:48). 
God accommodates God self according to our human capacity so that we can measure God’s 
immeasurableness by our small measure (Balzerak 2008, Battles 1998:35).
However, faith is more than seeing, it perceives the invisible, the not yet visible. Here, Calvin 
argues, faith needs the assurance of God’s Word in order to take root and to bear fruit. Whatever 
we may see of God’s presence and might is fleeting and would vanish without the confirmation 
of God’s Word. This does not arise out of anyone’s imagination (III.2.31). Calvin tirelessly explains 
that such faith is a gift from God that it is the work of the Holy Spirit that ensures that the seed of 
the Word becomes implanted, that faith depends on the promise of grace and that its certainty 
is not based on the strength of faith but on the promises that are sealed by God’s signature. Yet, 
none of this takes place outside the human senses of seeing and hearing and even of “tasting 
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the truth” (III.2.33). In fact, the interplay between the senses is remarkable. With reference to 
Isaiah 40-45 Calvin remarks:
It often seems that, when he begins to speak concerning the hope of pardon and recon ci-
liation, he turns to something else and wanders through long and superfluous mazes, recalling 
how wonderfully God governs the frame of heaven and earth together with the whole order of 
nature. Yet there is nothing here that does not serve the present circum stance. For unless the 
power of God, by which he can do all things, confronts our eyes, our ears will barely receive the 
Word or not esteem it at its true value (III.2.31).
Clearly, salvation through faith takes place in the realm of the (human) creature, making 
use of human capacities. Salvation hermeneutically presupposes God’s creation, that which is 
natural and thus transforms it. Nevertheless, the imagery that Calvin deploys is remarkable in 
that it consistently avoids the impression that faith may be attributed to the human ability to 
see and to hear. Faith is the result of the object that becomes visible through the light that is 
cast on the object. Likewise, hearing is not the product of our fertile imagination but is prima rily 
based on the Word of promise and forgiveness that is addressed to us. Indeed, Calvin insists that 
that we are blind (and deaf) in this respect. “The Word of God is like the sun, shining upon all 
those to whom it is proclaimed, but with no effect among the blind  … it cannot penetrate into 
our minds unless the Spirit, as the inner teacher, through his illumination makes entry for it” 
(III.2.34). Moreover, the problem is not so much our lack of perception: “the heart’s distrust is 
greater than the mind’s blindness” (III.2.36). That is why faith can only follow from the assurance 
of the Word that seals God’s promises in our hearts so that we become assured of God’s mercy. 
Yet, it is our hearts and minds (that which is “natural”) that become thus assured. The object 
that becomes visible and the word that is heard remains within this world; within that which is 
“natural”.
h) In his discussion of the Lord’s Prayer in Book III.20.40 Calvin discerns the hermeneutical 
implications of such insights. Why, he asks, is the Father understood to be “in heaven”? Calvin 
is well aware that the Father cannot be crudely or literally positioned in the heavens, for the 
heavens cannot contain God. Indeed, God cannot be “confined to any particular region but is 
diffused through all things.” Calvin then adds:
But our minds, so crass are they, could not have conceived his unspeakable glory other-
wise. Con sequently, it has been signified to us by “heaven,” for we can behold nothing more 
sublime or majestic than this. While, therefore, wherever our senses comprehend any thing 
they common ly attach it to that place, God is set beyond all place, so that when we would 
seek him we must rise above all perception of body and soul. … Therefore it is as if he had 
been said to be of infi nite greatness or loftiness, of incompre hensible essence, of boundless 
might, and of ever lasti ng immortality. But while we hear this, our thought must be raised 
higher when God is spoken of, lest we dream up anything earthly or phy si cal about him, lest 
we measure him by our small meas ure, or conform his will to our emotions. At the same 
time our confidence in him must be aroused, since we understand that heaven and earth 
are ruled by his providence and power (III.20.40).
This remarkable statement gets to the core of the hermeneutical problem of the knowledge of 
God. How can one know that which transcends oneself if it is indeed transcendent? How may 
the imperceptible be perceived? Calvin rightly sees that “heaven” here functions as the best 
available symbol of that which is sublime and majestic. This is a form of synecdoche where the 
part points beyond its immediate meaning in order to symbolise the whole (see Battles 1998:39-
40). He also sees that God’s transcendence cannot be confined to a particular loca tion, but is 
diffused every where. However, this does not lead to a vague form of pantheism. The clue here is 
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that this prayer is taught to us by Jesus Christ and is prayer in the name of Christ. This is indeed 
the location where the traces of God’s transcendence may best be found. In this way God is both 
exalted and very near to us (see Baars 2009, Smit 2009:70).
At the same time this qualitative assessment would not suffice on its own. The later Barthian 
emphasis, namely that God may be found in Jesus Christ and that the divinity of Christ does 
not merely say something about Christ but about the identity and character of God, addresses 
only one half of the hermeneutical problem. The question remains how we could say of Jesus of 
Nazareth that a manifestation of God’s presence may be found here? Why and how could one 
claim that Jesus is anything more than an ordinary human being? What does it mean that Jesus 
is “truly God” (vere Deus)?3 The question thus returns: How can one even speak about God? 
Moreover, how can one speak on God’s behalf with any degree of authority? How would one 
know that one’s words about God are more than just that: one’s own constructions about God?
The answer to the hermeneutical question is, of course, quite simple, namely that the point 
of departure is indeed that which can be perceived. The knowledge of God does not come from 
above but from below. It is derived from that which is natural. Hence, all theology is natural 
theology. This is not nullified by Calvin’s seemingly Neo-Platonic insistence that in seeking God 
“we must rise above all perception of body and soul.” Rising above perception (whatever that 
may mean) is only possible on the basis of perception. What is required are traces of God’s 
presence, intimations of transcendence, a sense of the infinite in the finite – even if the finite 
cannot contain the infinite (the famous extra Calvinisticum). The Christian claim is that such 
traces may best be found in Jesus Christ and perhaps nowhere more clearly than in this prayer. 
i) “We are not here discussing whether a human ministry is necessary for the sowing of God’s 
Word, from which faith may be conceived. This we shall discuss in another place (IV.1.5). But 
we say that the Word itself, however it be imparted to us, is like a mirror in which faith may 
contemplate God.” (III.2.6) 
God’s word is proclaimed through human instruments so that we would be able to hear that. 
Calvin is not merely stating the obvious here. He is arguing against a residual Gnosticism and 
Manichae ism, which maintain that fallible human instruments can only drag down the authority 
of the Word. Instead, Calvin argues, one should be grateful that God has opted to “consecrate 
to himself the mouths and tongues of men in order that his voice may resound in them” (IV.1.5). 
Spiritualising fanatics (Anabaptists), by contrast, may claim more immediate access to God’s 
will, but thus refuse to hold unto God’s word. It is on this basis that Calvin offers an elaborate 
discussion of the significance of Christian ministry, which, he maintains, remains primarily a 
ministry of God’s word, that is, a word of mercy and forgiveness (IV.1-13).
j) “Here our merciful Lord, according to his infinite kindness, so tempers himself to our capacity 
that, since we are creatures who always creep on the ground, cleave to the flesh, and, do not 
think about or even conceive of anything spiritual, he condescends to lead us to himself even 
by these earthly elements, and to set before us in the flesh a mirror of spiritual blessings. For 
if we were incorporeal (as Chrysostom says), he would give us these very things naked and 
incorporeal. Now, because we have souls engrafted in bodies, he imparts spiritual things under 
visible ones” (IV.14.3).
3  Pannenberg (1991:68) rightly insists that “The designation of Yahweh as God and the Christian 
attributing of deity to Jesus Christ make sense only on the condition of an established pre-Christian 
and extra-Christian use of the word ‘God’.” He adds the Christian restriction of this general category 
obviously implied a correction to the connotations attached in extra-Christian use. This suggests a defect 
in Barth’s understanding of the revelation in Christ. The latter presupposes that the world belongs to God 
and that humanity knows the God who is proclaimed by the gospel, even though a wholly new light is 
shed on this knowledge by the revelation in Christ (1991:75).
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Calvin’s famous treatment of the notion of a sacrament is of direct relevance for my exploration 
of the way in which that which is natural may serve as a carrier of God’s word of forgiveness. 
Following Augustine, Calvin defines a sacrament as “an outward sign by which the Lord seals on 
our consciences the promises of his good will toward us in order to sustain the weakness of our 
faith” (IV.14.1). He insists that the sign is meaningless without the word – which has to explain 
the meaning of the sign. The purpose of the sign is to confirm and seal the promises of God.
Calvin develops this insight in two crucial further steps. He first argues that the material signs 
are by themselves worthless and nothing more than water, bread and wine. They are sacraments 
(“visible words”) only in terms of that which they signify – which is explained through the Word. 
He says: “Indeed, the believer, when he sees the sacraments with his own eyes, does not halt 
at the physical sight of them, but by those steps (which I have indicated by analogy) rises up in 
devout contemplation to those lofty mysteries which lie hidden in the sacraments” (IV.14.5). The 
human senses are required in order to hear the word and to see the signs, but these signs are 
mere “mirrors in which we may contemplate the riches of God’s grace” (IV.14.6). The purpose 
of the sacraments is only to come to our aid to ascertain the trustworthiness of God’s promises. 
The next step is to emphasise that the sacraments do not have any secret powers to impart 
God’s grace. They become effective only through the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Only in this 
way do the sacraments help to establish and enhance faith in the heart of the believer – thus 
“[our] hearts are penetrated and affections moved and our souls opened for the sacraments 
to enter in” (IV.14.9). And; “For, that the Word may not beat your ears in vain, and that the 
sacraments may not strike your eyes in vain, the Spirit shows us that in them it is God speaking 
to us, softening the stubborn ness of our heart, and composing it to that obedience which it owes 
the Word of the Lord. Finally, the Spirit transmits those outward words and sacraments from our 
ears to our soul” (IV.14.10).
Calvin then adds:
If the Spirit be lacking, the sacraments can accomplish nothing more in our minds than the 
splendour of the sun shining upon blind eyes, or a voice sounding in deaf ears. Therefore, 
I make such a division between Spirit and sacraments that the power to act rests with the 
former, and the ministry alone is left to the latter—a ministry empty and trifling, apart from 
the action of the Spirit, but charged with great effect when the Spirit works within and 
manifests his power (IV.14.9).
Calvin acknowledges that the human eye would not see anything, nor would the ear be struck 
by any noise, unless they were created and fitted for seeing and hearing (IV.14.9). His argument 
in this section is not that the senses are worthless without the word that is heard and the object 
that is seen (see above).  Instead, he draws a complex analogy between such natural capabilities, 
which are necessary to hear and to perceive, and the necessity of the work of the Holy Spirit in 
our hearts, “which is to conceive, sustain, nourish, and establish faith”. Without such illumination 
the sacra ments would be worthless. Intriguingly, Calvin then adds: “There is only this difference: 
that our ears and eyes have naturally received the faculty of hearing and seeing; but Christ does 
the same thing in our hearts by special grace beyond the measure of nature” (IV.14.9). How 
should this “special grace beyond the measure of nature” be understood? Although one may 
suspect an unresolved Platonism here, one may also explore the relationship between a sign 
and that which it signifies (see below), precisely in order to take the human senses (and the 
letter of the law) as serious as Calvin does. For Calvin, it is through the Word of God that such 
connotations are attached, engraved upon the material signifier: “When they were inscribed by 
God’s Word a new form was put upon them, so that they began to be what previously they were 
not” (IV.14.18). The sacraments confirm and seal that which is promised through the Word; it 
“effectively performs what it symbolizes” (IV.15.14).
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Calvin applies this emphasis on signs and what they signify to the meaning of each of the 
sacra ments. On the Lord’s Supper he says for example: “our souls are fed by the flesh and blood 
of Christ in the same way that bread and wine keep and sustain physical life. For the analogy 
of the sign applies only if souls find their nourishment in Christ—which cannot happen unless 
Christ truly grows into one with us, and refreshes us by the eating of his flesh and the drinking 
of his blood” (IV.17.10). This quotation illustrates how the signification of signs is interpreted 
here along the dualisms of matter and ideas, of body and soul – albeit that the signified (human 
thoughts, ideas, that which is “spiritual”), although invisible, remains “natu ral” in the sense 
outlined above.
What is being signified can only be understood through the power of the Holy Spirit. Calvin 
says:
Even though it seems unbelievable that Christ’s flesh, separated from us by such great 
distance, penetrates to us, so that it becomes our food, let us remember how far the 
secret power of the Holy Spirit towers above all our senses, and how foolish it is to wish to 
measure his immeas ur ableness by our measure. What, then, our mind does not compre-
hend let faith conceive: that the Spirit truly unites things separated in space (IV.17.10).
I therefore say (what has always been accepted in the church and is today taught by all of 
sound opinion) that the sacred mystery of the Supper consists in two things: physical signs, 
which, thrust before our eyes, represent to us, according to our feeble capacity, things invisible; 
and spiritual truth, which is at the same time represented and displayed through the symbols 
themselves (IV.17.11).
These observations calls for further reflection on Calvin’s theory of signs (and of symbols4), 
on the relation between what Saussure would later call the (material) signifier and the (ideal) 
signified, but also between a sign and its referent. In terms of the use of the term “natural” 
above, the signified (as embedded in human thought processes) remains a function of cultural 
evolution and is in that sense “natural”. The relation between sign and referent is far trickier. 
Can a sign refer to extra-linguistic realities – even when it is acknowledged that our only access 
to such a referent is mediated through language? Is human language a self-enclosed world? Can 
human language refer to God (a transcendent referent)?
These questions cannot be resolved here and Calvin’s semiotics would require closer 
investigation. Suffice it to say that Calvin severely criticised the failure to distinguish between a 
sign and that which it signifies. He ridicules notions of transubstantiation precisely on this point 
(IV.17.14-30). He distinguishes between the “signification” (the promises of God), the matter or 
substance that is signified (Christ’s death and resurrection) and the effect that follows from both 
(“redemption, righteousness, sanctification, and eternal life, and all the other benefits Christ 
gives to us”) (IV.17.11). The last of these are understood pneumato logically and calls for further 
reflection in the discipline of hermeneutics, not only semiotics. 
k) “It is not what is seen, then, but what is believed, that feeds” (IV.17.3, in a discussion of 
Augustine’s position).
One last comment on the unresolved dualisms in Calvin’s theology remains important here. 
The contrast between that which is visible and that which is invisible may be regarded as 
4  Calvin recognised the distinction between signs and symbols (where the symbol participates in that 
which it symbolises). He says: “For though the symbol differs in essence from the thing signified (in 
that the latter is spiritual and heavenly, while the former is physical and visible), still, because it not only 
symbolizes the thing that it has been consecrated to represent as a bare and empty token, but also truly 
exhibits it, why may its name not rightly belong to the thing?” (IV.17.21). Following Augustine, Calvin 
thus concludes that sacraments have a certain likeness to those things of which they are sacraments. 
Otherwise they would not be sacraments at all (IV.17.21).
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unproblematic. It would, incidentally, also appeal to contemporary African sensibilities. Likewise, 
one need not assume a Platonic or Cartesian dualism between the ideal and the material to 
distinguish between brain functions and thought, between signifier and signified. However, 
Calvin often juxtaposes this contrast with the ones between soul and body, the carnal and 
the spiritual, this earth and heaven,5 this life and eternal life. The sign is material and visible 
and differs “in essence” from the reality that is signified – which is not only invisible but also 
“spiritual” and “heaven ly” (IV.17.21). 
It should be noted that this contrast is built upon cosmological assumptions (see Schreiner 
1991:7-37). The problem that Calvin addresses in his discussion of the sacraments is in what way 
Christ’s body, which is in heaven (see IV.17.26), could be present in the symbol of the bread? 
Calvin insists that Christ’s body is finite and remains in heaven, giving weight to the meaning 
of Christ’s ascension (IV.17.27. It therefore does not require a feigned miracle to make his 
body present (across a “great distance in space”) in the elements of sacrament (IV.17.26). It is 
ludicrous to consider two bodies of Jesus Christ – one visible in heaven and one hidden in secret 
under bread (IV.17.28). One can guard against such crude, superstitious and literalist notions 
by recognising the distinction between a sign and what it signifies. Christ becomes present 
primarily through the symbols and though the power of the Holy Spirit – through which God 
“pours down his grace from heaven through the Spirit upon us” (IV.17.28). Yet, the unresolved 
dualism in Calvin’s theology cannot be denounced as merely Platonic as he also insists that in his 
resurrection Jesus Christ received the same true flesh as when he was born from the virgin Mary, 
that it is Christ’s body that is in heaven, and that the hope for the resurrection of our bodies and 
(inter estingly enough) for our ascension into heaven is based on that (IV.17.29). Accordingly, 
we need not “drag” Christ down from heaven; we may hope to be “lifted up” to him (IV.17.30).
From a contemporary perspective such weight attributed to the ascension of course does 
not resolve the cosmological problem. How may we fathom the distinction between earth and 
heaven? How did Calvin come to know about that which is “heavenly” (except by following 
the biblical vocabulary)? How can our words refer to (make present) that which transcends the 
natural? In short, how can our human words refer to God? How can we speak with any authority 
about God and God’s word to us?
The unresolved hermeneutical and cosmological problem is well illustrated by the following:
Once more I wish to warn my readers to consider diligently the purport of our doctrine: 
whether it depends upon common sense or, having surmounted the world on the wings of 
faith, soars up to heaven. We say Christ descends to us both by the outward symbol and 
by his Spirit, that he may truly quicken our souls by the substance of his flesh and of his 
blood. He who does not perceive that many miracles are subsumed in these few words is 
more than stupid. For nothing is more beyond the natural than that souls should borrow 
spiritual and heavenly life from a flesh that had its origin from earth, and underwent death. 
There is nothing more incredible than that things severed and removed from one another 
by the whole space between heaven and earth should not only be connected across such a 
great distance but also be united, so that souls may receive nourishment from Christ’s flesh 
(IV.17.24).
5  Calvin distinguishes between “earthly” and “heavenly” things in the following way: “I call ‘earthly 
things’ those which do not pertain to God or his Kingdom, to true justice, or to the blessedness of the 
future life; but which have their significance and relationship with regard to the present life and are, in 
a sense, confined within its bounds. I call ‘heavenly things’ the pure knowledge of God, the nature of 
true righteousness, and the mysteries of the Heavenly Kingdom. The first class includes government, 
household management, all mechanical skills, and the liberal arts. In the second are the knowledge of God 
and of his will, and the rule by which we conform our lives to it” (II.2.13).
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CALVIN’S NOTION OF SIGNIFICATION 
The preceding discussion has illustrated that Calvin was certainly not unaware of the herme-
neutical problem of coming to knowledge of God (understood by him in terms of faith as 
piety, that is, as reverence, awe and trust). It is obvious that he emphasised that any “natural” 
knowledge of God, unaided by the witnesses of Scripture is severely limited and distorted due to 
the legacy of human sin, therefore cannot lead to adequate knowledge of God and only suffices 
to preclude human excuses on the basis of ignorance. What is less obvious is the role played by 
such human capacities, the human senses and our preceding vocabularies in order to come to 
“true” knowledge of God.
That we can actually hear the Word of God (the word of forgiveness) and that we can read 
the Scriptures can only be based on our “natural” capacities. However, that would be worthless 
without being confronted by the object that is seen and the word (the sound) that is heard. For 
Calvin, that word comes to us from outside our own capabilities. The heart of the matter lies in 
his insistence that the liberating word of God’s forgiveness is not based on our merits, on our 
good works, on first becoming righteous before being declared righteous, on our penitence, or 
on our faith. It is based solely on God’s mercy, on God’s grace as expressed in the work of Christ, 
and, in the very final analysis, on God’s election. Thus the emphasis is not on our hearing but on 
the word of forgiveness that is heard. Moreover, that word of forgiveness is precisely not merely 
a human word (that would imply that we are forgiving ourselves), but indeed God’s word. But 
what could that mean?
This word of forgiveness does not come to us in some mysterious way. It is audible and 
tangible. The object that is seen and touched, the word that is heard, still forms part of our 
world (of “nature”). The bridge between the known and the unknown, the finite and the infinite 
is the Logos that was addressed to us and became flesh – visible, touchable, palpable (Battles 
1998:24).6 It is a Word that is always already amongst us. This is communicated to us on the basis 
of the life and work of Jesus Christ, through the apostolic witnesses, the biblical texts, exegesis 
and proclamation. It is through the letter of Scripture that the word of forgiveness is spoken and 
heard. This is how God’s mercy is made known to us. It is received through our human senses. 
As we have seen above, Calvin is very much aware of the role played by the senses and takes our 
“natural” capacities for granted.
God is therefore made known to us through the human senses. However, none of the objects 
of our senses would by themselves yield knowledge of God. Many people passing Jesus by on 
the road would see in him nothing more than another traveller. Many people today would hear 
in preaching nothing more than a speech delivered in a religious community. How, then, does 
something that is entirely “natural” convey the presence of God? How does that which is finite 
bear evidence of the infinite (even if the finite cannot contain the infinite)? 
In the terminology of semiotics this begs complex questions about the ways in which signs 
and symbols function. What is the relation between a (material) signifier and a signified (the 
connota tions attached to a signifier in human thought)? On the basis of the argument above, 
both the material signifier and the ideal signified remain part of “nature” and in that sense 
entirely “natural”. That applies also to human thought patterns such as moral judgements and 
moral codes which are based on the assumption that what reality is, is not what it ought to be. 
Such judgements may seem to be other than “natural”. To derive an “ought” from an “is” may 
even be regarded as falling in the trap of the naturalistic fallacy. However, in the sense that such 
moral codes are human constructs they form part of human cultural evolution and in that sense 
6  See Battles (1998) on Calvin’s rhetorical use of the strategy of accommodation: God accommodates 
himself according to human capacity.
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part of nature as defined above. 
The problem becomes more complex in the case of religious language where the signified 
tends to transcend human thought, indicating something that we cannot grasp, suggesting 
intimations of transcendence, of God’s presence. Moreover, how should the elusive relation 
between a sign and its referent be understood? Where such a referent is said to transcend 
human thought, this poses special difficulties. Indeed, how can one refer to God and God’s word 
of forgiveness at all? In the case of symbols, which already contain what they signify, this relation 
between sign and refer ent becomes even more complex. The easy option would be to regard 
such theological language as nothing more than a human construction. This would be to base 
theological language on anthro po logy along the lines of modern liberal theology. As I argued 
above, this is hermeneu tically inevi ta ble, but to leave it at that would be reductionist. It would 
not do justice to the claim that the intended referent of such language expresses Someone who 
transcends “nature” by virtue of creating it in the first place.
Obviously, I cannot hope to resolve such complex questions here. In Calvin’s terminology 
such intimations of transcendence are only possible on the basis of the illumination of the Holy 
Spirit through which faith takes root in the heart of the believer. Yet, such illumination is also 
not portrayed as something mysterious but as taking place through the exegesis of the meaning 
(the letter) of the text in order to appropriate its usefulness (the spirit) within the context of 
Christian piety (IV.8.13).  I do wish to highlight the complex problem that this poses for a forensic 
notion of justification: how may it be said that the human word of forgiveness (which forms 
part of “nature”) on the basis of what Christ has done (in the history of “nature”) is ultimately 
God’s word of forgiveness (without which there would be no consolation) in such a way that the 
basis for such forgiveness is not attributed to our own doing (our good works, our faith)? Can 
such tension between the sign (the signifier and the signified) and its tran scendent referent be 
sustained?
Nevertheless, such a sense of transcendence can be articulated in human thinking, speaking 
and writing. As many contributors to discourse on science and religion have observed, the use 
of symbols is one of the distinctive features of the human species. Indeed, even though this 
is an area where angels should fear to tread, discussions of the transcendent (as signified or 
as transcendent referent) fill theological libraries. All too often theologians, including Calvin 
(and Barth!), tend to become remarkably sure about that which transcend us and speak with 
considerable authority about that. The ensnaring danger is to speak about God on God’s behalf 
and with God’s authority.7
One may retort that such a sense of authority is not focused on the signified but on the 
signifiers that are deemed to be carriers of God’s presence. Accordingly, and speaking with Barth, 
the focus should be on the threefold word (of God), namely Jesus of Nazareth (the incarnation 
of the Logos), the biblical texts (Holy Scripture) and preaching (the Word of God). In my view 
7  In my view this argument is nevertheless based on a failure to grasp the nature of religious language. 
When one engages with constructions of that which transcends “nature”, it is not possible to maintain an 
objective distance from such a construction. One cannot view it as if from the outside precisely because 
such a construction is necessarily all-inclusive. Instead, one is urged to contemplate how the world would 
look like if its origin, destiny and meaning have to be understood in this light. One has to think, speak 
and live from within this universe of meaning. Typically, the mode of discourse then shifts to language 
about who God is, what God does and what God says – to the language of liturgy, preaching, paraenesis 
and doctrine. This may be sustained as long as the fragile nature of such discourse is recognised, as long 
as we acknowledge that we are attempting to give answers to questions that we have to ask but know that 
we cannot answer in any final way. Such language may form our last, ultimate words, the language of 
doxology (and of divine election), but cannot provide a firm foundation upon which an entire theological 
system may be built.
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that would be entirely appropriate. However, it should then be noted that such signifiers form 
part of the world around us and are in that sense “natural”. Moreover, they are experienced 
in relation with other signifiers (in an ongoing differential play of signi fiers which shape that 
which is signified) and through our senses and our preceding vocabularies. Any such theological 
language thus remains entirely human, fully natural. 
One may, from another angle, re-describe the use of such signs as a function of God’s 
accommodation to our human capacity (the notion of accommodatio Dei). As Battles (1998) 
and Balserak (2009:372) observe, Calvin paid more attention to such accommodation than any 
other theologian except Chrysostom. Accord ing ly, God revealed God self to us in such a way that 
we would be able to understand that. Such ac com mo dation would apply to each aspect of the 
threefold word of God, but especially to the in carnation. However, such a re-description, too, 
has to be understood as an attempt to view human under stand ing from God’s perspective. Such 
a perspective can only be obtained “from below”, from within our capacities, from within that 
which is natural. It does not and cannot come directly “from above”. How, one needs to ask, can 
one know that God decided on such accommodation? The key here, as Zachman (2006:209) 
recognises, is Calvin’s analogical and anagogical understanding of the relations between a sign 
and the reality signified. Zachman describes this in terms of the visible images of the invisible 
God – in the theatre of God’s glory, but also in terms of the cross of Christ.8
In recognising the role of an unresolved complexio oppositorum in Calvin’s theology, it seems 
to me that the only way to capture Calvin’s position is on the basis of a hermeneutical spiral. This 
spiral would move from the role of the human senses in order to gain knowledge of the world 
around us, which would provide some categories in terms of which the knowledge of God that 
emerges through an engagement with Scripture becomes possible, to the corrective role played 
by the Scriptures transform the connotations attached to such categories from within, in order 
to be able to see God’s presence for the first time in the world around us with the help of the 
spectacles of Scripture and to contemplate the wonders of God’s works. Crudely formulated: 
without contemplation of the heavens we would not have any notion of God; without God’s 
revelation in Jesus Christ we would have no clarity on God’s identity and no access to God’s 
path for salvation. This suggest that human knowledge of the world around us does not merely 
have a negative function (as many commentators wish to emphasise), but plays a necessary 
hermeneutical role in order to be able to hear the Word of God or to read the Scriptures in 
the first place. Moreover, the purpose of Scripture is to provide the spectacles to detect God’s 
presence in God’s works. The spectacles are not required to read Scripture, nor are we to be 
preoccupied with reading the Scriptures. We require Scripture in order to appreciate the theatre 
of God’s glory.
This does not imply that Calvin himself would have explained it in this way. Thomas (1992:135) 
may be on the right track in suggesting that Calvin simply does not concern himself with such 
a herme neutical question: “He [Calvin] probably felt it too shrouded in mystery to warrant 
attention.” Calvin’s own view is perhaps best expressed in the following quotation picked up by 
Thomas (1992:136):
Therefore, as we cannot come to Christ unless the Spirit of God draws us, so when we are 
drawn we are lifted up in mind and heart above our understanding. For the soul, illumined 
by him, takes on a new keenness, as it were, to contemplate the heavenly mysteries, whose 
splendour had previously blinded it. And man’s understanding, thus beamed by the light of the 
Holy Spirit, then at last truly begins to taste those things, which belong to the Kingdom of God, 
8  On the distinction between images and living images and the dialectic between word and image, see 
especially Zachman (2007).
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having formerly been quite foolish and dull in tasting them (Institutes III.2.34).
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: THE (S)ELECTION OF SIGNIFIERS
Perhaps the underlying problem here is not whether such signifiers are natural, whether they 
come to us from the inside or the outside (including the word of forgiveness), or whether they 
are enmesh ed in a web of meanings and interpretations. The issue at stake here is the selection 
of signifiers, the privileging of some traces of God’s presence above others. It may true that 
we can find traces of God’s presence elsewhere, indeed everywhere, but the witness of the 
Christian tradition is that God’s presence can be found more clearly than anywhere else in the 
narrative of Israel’s notion of God, in the life and work of Jesus the Christ, and through witnesses 
to the presence of the Holy Spirit in and through the ministry and mission of Christian churches. 
This can only be under stood as a qualitative judgement, namely that these sources offer us 
the clearest available traces of God’s presence. These signifiers are carriers of a signified that 
can help us to come to terms with the origins, destiny and meaning of the history of the entire 
universe, of our own lives and of our struggles with the demands of life, with suffering and with 
the evil that surrounds us and for which we are partly responsible.
In my view this would require from reformed theology to rethink distinctions made between 
the so called “book of nature” and the “book of Scripture” or between “general revelation and 
“special revelation”. Such distinctions become problematic the moment such categories are com-
partmentalised as two distinct sources for reflecting on God’s self-revela tion. Then questions on 
the relationship between these two sources immediately arise. In my book the “book of nature” 
and the “book of Scripture” cannot be understood as two distinct sources. “If “special revelation” 
forms part of nature, as I argued above, then it should be regarded as a qualitative judgement 
in terms of which some traces of God’s self-revelation are selected on the basis of their relative 
clarity. The locus of special revelation forms part of the locus of general revelation. In diagram 
form one would need a circle (or a few dots and a cross) within a much bigger circle instead of 
two circles along side one another. Or perhaps one may picture this three-dimensionally as a 
funnel: with a wide upper rim and a small inner tube that nevertheless exercises all the suction 
power. To express this more acutely: God’s special revelation in Jesus Christ (but also through the 
history of Israel and in the early church) forms one moment in the history of the universe / the 
world / nature (and in the evolution of species) – even if one wishes to maintain retrospectively 
that the universe itself was created through the wisdom of the divine Logos. 
On this basis the critique of natural theology would suggest that a particular theological 
position does not do justice to God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ because it seems to value 
other clues to God’s revelation higher than that (see Barth 2002:74-5). However, any access to 
God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ can only be through categories derived from “nature”
In the same way the axiom of sola Scriptura requires reconsideration. It cannot be understood 
as the only source of the true knowledge of God, but it can be viewed as the best available 
source and can be used to judge other sources (Scripture as norm). However, such judgement 
cannot be exercised in a purist way since the biblical texts are embedded in a network of other 
“texts” and meanings, including pre-Israelite notions of God, and are interpreted through our 
existing vocabularies. It is therefore necessary to consider the inverse of Calvin’s image that 
Scripture provides us with the necessary spectacles to see God in the world of nature. It is also 
true that nature provides us with the spectacles to read Scripture and to discern God’s presence 
in and through the reading of the biblical texts.
To insist that all theology is natural theology may in this way encourage a sense of theological 
humility. It may help us to see that we are here attempting to answer ultimate questions that 
http://ngtt.journals.ac.za
82 Deel 52 Nommer 1 & 2 Maart en Junie 2011
we cannot help but to raise, but know that we cannot answer, even if we have to live on a daily 
basis from the answers that we have received. It may help us to recognise that when we speak 
about God we can only do it from with in the world of nature, from the humus where we came 
from and to which we shall return. Indeed, language about God can be nothing more than our 
last, final and ultimate words, the language of doxology.
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